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Abstract
Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) is
blamed to leave frequencies outside its frame-
work. In this paper we consider this problem
from the point of view of conditioning in the
MTE. We describe the class of belief func-
tions for which marginal consistency with
observed frequencies may be achieved and
conditional belief functions are proper be-
lief functions,and deal with implications for
approximation of general belief functions by
this class and for inference models in MTE.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Dempster-Shafer Theory or the Mathematical
Theory of Evidence (MTE) [21, 3] is intended to be
a generalization of bayesian theory of subjective prob-
ability [24]. This theory offers capability of represent-
ing ignorance in a simple and direct way, compatibil-
ity with the classical probability theory, compatibility
with boolean logic and feasible computational com-
plexity [20]. MTE may be applied for (1) representa-
tion of incomplete knowledge, (2) belief updating, (3)
and for combination of evidence [18].MTE covers the
statistics of random sets and may be applied for rep-
resentation of incomplete statistical knowledge. Ran-
dom set statistics is quite popular in analysis of opinion
polls whenever partial indecisiveness of respondents is
allowed [4]. Practical applications of MTE include:
integration of knowledge from heterogeneous sources
for object identification [2], technical diagnosis under
unreliable measuring devices [5], medical applications:
[7, 31].
In spite of indicated merits, MTE experienced sharp
criticism from many sides. The basic line of criti-
cism is connected with the relationship between the
belief function (the basic concept of MTE) and fre-
quencies [30, 8]. A number of attempts to interpret
belief functions in terms of probabilities have failed so
far to produce a fully compatible interpretation with
MTE - see e.g. [14, 8, 6] etc. Shafer [24] and Smets
[27], in defense of MTE, dismissed every attempt to
interpret MTE frequentistically. Shafer stressed that
even modern (that meant bayesian) statistics is not
frequentistic at all (bayesian theory assigns subjective
probabilities), hence frequencies be no matter at all.
Wasserman [30] strongly opposed claims of Shafer [24]
about frequencies and bayesian theory. Wasserman
pointed out that the major success story of bayesian
theory is the exchangeability theory of de Finetti,
which treats frequency based probabilities as a special
case of bayesian belief. Hence frequencies, as Wasser-
man claims, are inside the bayesian theory, but outside
the Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
In this paper we consider this problem from the point
of view of apriorical and aposteriorical conditioning in
the MTE. We describe the class of belief functions for
which: marginal consistency with observed frequencies
may be achieved, apriorical conditional belief functions
are proper belief functions
We will assume that the Reader is familiar with ba-
sic concepts of MTE like: belief function (Bel), basic
probability assignment function (bpa, or m), common-
ality function(Q), marginalization (projection) onto a
subset s of the set of all variables (Bel↓s), vacuous ex-
tension onto the set of variables (Bel↑s), focal points
(sets for which bpa is non-zero). These terms are ex-
plained in many standard papers and books on MTE
[21, 25].
2 CASE-BASED UNDERSTANDING
OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS
In an attempt to overcome the reason for those nu-
merous failures to interpret consistently Dempster’s
rule of combination, a new frequency interpretation of
MTE has been proposed in [13]. It has been demon-
strated there that, in general, Dempster’s rule has a
destructive impact on the data so that whatever we
expect calculation of conditional probabilities (given
an event) differs from whatever we obtain under con-
ditioning (given an event) in MTE (see the definition
of aposteriorical conditioning of Shafer in [22].
Let us have a look at SQL construct to calculate joint
probability distribution from a database in two vari-
ables P(X,Y):
create view Total (Counted) as select count(*) from
Cases;
create view Probability (X,Y,Prob) as select X,Y,
count(*)/Counted from Cases,Total group by
X,Y;
Let us look at calculation of conditional probability
P (X,Y |X ∈ AX). We proceed as follows: we select
first the proper subset of cases from the database and
proceed to calculate the unconditional probability for
the selected cases.
create view SelectedCases (X,Y) as select X,Y from
Cases where X ∈ AX;
create view TotalCond (Counted) as select count(*)
from SelectedCases;
create view CondProbability (X,Y,CondProb) as se-
lect Y,X,count(*)/Counted
from SelectedCases,TotalCond where X ∈ AX
group by X, Y;
If we calculate a conditional probability P (X,Y |X ∈
AX , X ∈ BX) on a series of conditions (X ∈ AX , X ∈
BX) we can proceed first by selecting cases for the
first, then for the second condition etc., finding the
intersection, and then calculating the probabilities (id
- the identifier).
create view SelectedCasesA (id,X,Y) as select id,X,Y
from Cases where X ∈ AX;
create view SelectedCasesB (id,X,Y) as select id,X,Y
from Cases where X ∈ BX;
create view SelectedCases (id,X,Y) as select id,X,Y
from SelectedCasesA
intersection select id,X,Y from SelectedCasesB ;
create view TotalCond (Counted) as select count(*)
from SelectedCases;
create view CondProbability (X,Y,CondProb) as se-
lect Y,X,count(*)/Counted
from SelectedCases,TotalCond where X ∈ AX
group by X, Y;
Let us look at calculation of basic probability assign-
ment (bpa) m(X,Y) from data :
create view Total (Counted) as select count(*) from
Cases;
create view bpa (X,Y,m) as select X,Y,
count(*)/TCounted from Cases,Total group by
X,Y;
Let us look at calculation of aposterioric conditional
bpa m(X,Y ||X ∈ AX) We have to proceed as fol-
lows: we select first the proper subset of cases from
the database and MODIFY the values for the variable
X. Then we proceed to calculate the unconditional bpa
for the selected and updated cases.
create view UpdatedCases (X,Y) as select X ∩AX,Y
from Cases where X ∩ AX 6= ∅;
create view TotalCond (Counted) as select count(*)
from UpdatedCases;
create view Cond bpa (X,Y,Condbpa) as select
X,Y,count(*)/Counted
from UpdatedCases,TotalCond ;
If we calculate a conditional bpa m(||X ∈ AX , X ∈
BX) on a series of conditions (X ∈ AX , X ∈ BX) we
CANNOT proceed by selecting cases for the first, then
for the second condition etc., finding the intersection,
and then calculating the bpa, because this would yield
wrong results due to side effects stemming from case
modifications.
This has a serious impact if we try to factorize a belief
function into simpler components, e.g. for purposes of
propagation of uncertainty (methods of propagation of
uncertainty are presented e.g. in [1, 25]. It turns out
that:
• It is, in general, impossible to factorize a joint
belief distribution into components being condi-
tional belief functions 1 (see eg. [1] for a dis-
cussion why two different notions of conditioning
1Notice that in the domain of probability distributions,
EVERY probability distribution may be represented by a
composition of conditional probability distributions as so-
called bayesian network
are needed for MTE: the posteriori-conditionals as
conditionals in the sense of Shafer, and a priori-
conditionals invented by Cano et al.,)
• A priori-conditional belief functions as proposed
by Cano et al. in general do not exists (see a dis-
cussion on non-existence of a-priori conditionals
in MTE presented by [26]) 2
• What is more, it is often impossible to factorize
a belief function Bel in variables p, q, r into two
factors one Bel1 in variables p, r and the second
Bel2 in variables q, r even if in conditional distri-
bution given any value of the variable r, variables
p, q are independent (see [29], that is when for ev-
ery subset ri of the domain of the variable r the
following holds:
Bel(||ri)
↓p,q = Bel(||ri)
↓p ⊕Bel(||ri)
↓q
Therefore in papers [9, 10, 13] we have presented an-
other approach to factorization of belief functions in
terms of anticonditional belief functions. It turns
out, however, that anticonditional belief functions are
in general not belief functions but only pseudo-belief
functions (that is ones with non-negative commonality
functions). Thus, anticonditional belief functions have
no direct counterparts in the physical world, as the ba-
sic probability assignment may take negative values.
One can be tempted to suggest, that one shall then
resign from modeling the joint belief distribution and
instead try to find a marginally consistent decomposi-
tion of the joint belief distribution. But:
• What is the class of Dempster-Shafer (DS) be-
lief functions for which apriori-conditional belief
functions exist ?
• How can general belief functions and uncertainty
propagation for them be approximated by this
class of belief functions and uncertainty propa-
gation for them ?
• How can the belief functions and the reasoning
with them be related to frequencies (cases)?
2In probability distributions, a-priori and a-posteriori
conditionals from the point of view of frequencies coincide,
and they always exist: Let us assume P(X,Y) is a fre-
quency based (case-based) probability distribution of X,Y.
A posteriori conditional distribution of variable X given
variable Y=y is interpreted as uncertainty distribution of
variable X P ′(X|Y = y) if we restrict ourselves only to
cases for which Y=y. Apriori conditional distribution of X
given Y is a function P (X|Y ) in X,Y defined as P (X|Y ) =
P (X∩Y )/P (Y ) for all values of y for which P (Y = y) > 0.
Obviously: P ′(X = x|Y = y) = P (X = x|Y = y) if
P (Y = y) > 0.
3 CORRECT APPROXIMATION
OF CONDITIONALS
Shafer [22] suggested that a belief function may emerge
if we observe a variable X with domain of values ΞX
indirectly (via a mapping f) by observing actually an-
other variable Y with a domain ΞY such that the
mapping f : ΞY → ΞX is not a function. Hence,
in some cases, if we observe a single value ξY of
the variable Y, we can tell at most that the value
of the variable X belongs to a non-empty set of ele-
ments {ξX1 , ξX2 , . . . , ξXn}. So a probability distribu-
tion P(Y) in Y translates into a basic belief assign-
ment function, from which one calculates easily belief
distribution BelX in X. In this way we could get a
case-based distribution in variable X.
Variable
Y
Corresponding
set values of
X (A)
fre-
quen-
cy
mX(A) BelX(A)
y1 {x1} 10 .10 .10
y2 {x1, x2} 20 .20 .30
y3 {x2, x3} 30 .30 .70
y4 {x3} 40 .40 .40
– {x1, x2, x3} – .0 1.0
This could be extended simply to multivariate belief
distributions. However, we encounter one interpreta-
tional problem:
Let us consider the following frequency table in vari-
ables X and Z:
X Z frequencies
{x1, x2} {z1, z2} 20
What shall be the focal points of the multivariate be-
lief function BelX,Z in two variables X,Z ? Marginal
consistency will be achieved either if we assume
mX,Z
1
({(x1, z1), (x1, z2), (x2, z1), (x2, z2)}) = 1
and if we take
mX,Z
2
({(x1, z1), (x2, z2)}) = 1
and if we suppose
mX,Z
3
({(x1, z2), (x2, z1)}) = 1
and for many other belief functions. But which one
is the best ? Let us try to calculate the conditional
belief function Beli(||X = x1)
↓Z . (From Shafer’s for-
mula: Beli(||X = x1)↓Z = (Beli ⊕ BelX=xi)
↓Z with
BelX=xi being a belief function with the only focal
point mX=xi({(x1, z1), (x1, z2)}) = 1). We get three
totally different results - three belief functions with
differing focal points: m1(||X = x1)↓Z({z1, z2}) = 1,
m2(||X = x1)↓Z({z1}) = 1, m3(||X = x1)↓Z({z2}) =
1.
It is next to impossible to decide which of these con-
ditionals is the correct one from the point of view of
the observed data. So which belief function shall be
treated as the most representative for the data ? We
suggest here the first one (Bel1) for the following rea-
sons:
1. if we observe X,Z separately, we have no reason
to assume that x1 must co-occur with z1 but never
with z2 etc - we assume we have no more infor-
mation than actually visible from the data,
2. the methods of uncertainty propagation suggested
both by Cano et al. [1] and Shenoy & Shafer [25]
implicitly assume that the joint belief in values
of observed variables X1, X2, ...Xn is the compo-
sition of the values of individual variables:
Belobserv = BelX1=A1⊕BelX2=A2⊕. . .⊕BelXn=An
with Ai ⊆ ΞXi being a subset of the domain of the
ith variable. Violation of this assumption would
invalidate the respective method of uncertainty
propagation.
Let us consider now the following data in three (logi-
cal) variables X,Y,Z, giving the belief function Beland.
X= Y= Z= fre-
quen-
cy
mand
(AX×
AY ×
AZ)
{tX} {tY } {tZ} 10 .10
{tX} {fY } {fZ} 10 .10
{fX} {tY } {fZ} 10 .10
{fX} {fY } {fZ} 10 .10
{tX} {tY , fY } {tZ , fZ} 10 .10
{fX} {tY , fY } {fZ} 10 .10
{tX , fX} {tY } {tZ , fZ} 10 .10
{tX , fX} {fY } {fZ} 10 .10
{tX , fX} {tY , fY } {tZ , fZ} 20 .20
Let us consider calculation of an apriori conditional
belief function in the sense of Cano et al. [1] such that
it would imply the value of Z given X,Y. A look at
the data would suggest that variables X,Y and Z are
connected by the logical equation: X ∧ Y = Z so that
one might suggest a belief function with focal point
m&({(tX , tY , tZ), (tX , fY , fZ),
(fX , tY , fZ), (fX , fY , fZ)}) = 1
is the apriori conditional connecting X,Y and Z. But
this is a wrong conclusion, because:
Beland 6= Bel
↓{X,Y }
and ⊕Bel&
What is more, the Cano et al a priori conditional of
Z given X,Y does not exist at all !!! Therefore, de-
composition of a joint belief distribution into condi-
tionals cannot in general be achieved. However, we
must acknowledge that marginal consistency is actu-
ally achieved, that is :
(Beland)
↓X = (Bel
↓{X,Y }
and ⊕Bel&)
↓X
(Beland)
↓Y = (Bel
↓{X,Y }
and ⊕Bel&)
↓Y
(Beland)
↓Z = (Bel
↓{X,Y }
and ⊕Bel&)
↓Z
Can we always construct a marginally consistent
apriori-conditional ? We shall assume that we have
found a marginally consistent apriori conditional Bel|p
of Belief function Bel given set of variables p iff Bel|p
is a belief function and for every variable X:
(Bel)↓X = (Bel|p ⊕Bel↓p)↓X
let us consider the following belief distribution in vari-
ables X,Z
X Z frequencies
{x1} {z1} 40
{x1, x2} {z2} 60
It is easily to show that marginally consistent Bel|X
does not exist.
What is then the class of belief functions possessing
marginally consistent conditionals ? What is the class
of marginally consistent conditional belief functions ?
It is easy to show that if there exists a marginally
consistent conditional belief function Bel|p of the be-
lief function Bel given set of variables p then there
exists another marginally consistent conditional be-
lief function Bel
|p
Ξ
of the belief function Bel given set
of variables p such that (Bel
|p
Ξ
)↓p has only one focal
point (m
|p
Ξ
)↓p(Ξp) = 1 with Ξp being the joint domain
of variables from set p. In other words, Cano et al.
apriori-conditionals represent completely the class of
marginally consistent conditional belief functions.
Hence it is nearly obvious that in general case-based
(separately measured) belief functions do not possess
marginally consistent conditional belief functions.
Therefore it is in general of primary interest to find
an appropriate approximation of general belief func-
tions by means of decompositions into Cano’s et al
apriori-conditionals. Let us say that an approxima-
tion Bel′ of belief function Bel is correct iff for every
set A Bel′(A) < Bel(A). An approximation Bel′ of
belief function Bel is marginally correct iff for every
variable X and every set A Bel′
↓X
(A)) < Bel↓X(A).
Let us consider the following algorithm for calculation
of a correct approximation of the function Bel in vari-
ables X,Y:
0. We initialize the basic probability assignment
function mcond defined over variables X,Y with
0 for every subset of ΞX × ΞY .
1. For each set AX ⊆ ΞX with m↓X(AX) > 0 we
calculate the quantity g(AX , AY ) := m(AX ×
AY )/m
↓X(AX).
2. i:=1, q:=0
3. For each set AX ⊆ ΞX with m↓X(AX) > 0 we
select a set ri(AX) ⊆ ΞY with g(AX , ri(AX)) > 0.
gi,r,min be the minimum of g(AX , ri(AX)) over all
AX ⊆ ΞX with m↓X(AX) > 0
4. For the relation ri we select a function ai :
ΞX → 2ΞY such that for each set AX ⊆ ΞX with
m↓X(AX) > 0 we have ri(AX) ⊆
⋃
ξX∈AX
ai(ξX)
5. We update the function mcond as follows: We cal-
culate the set A =
⋃
ξX∈ΞX
{ξX} × ai(ξX). Then
mcond(A) := mcond(A) + gi,r,min.
6. We update the g function as follows: For each set
AX ⊆ ΞX with m↓X(AX) > 0 g(AX , ri(AX)) :=
g(AX , ri(AX))− gi,r,min
7. For each set AX ⊆ ΞX with m↓X(AX) > 0
q :=
q + gi,r,min ∗m↓X(AX) ∗ card(AX )
card(
⋃
ξX∈AX
ai(ξX))
8. i:=i+1. If g is equal zero everywhere then termi-
nate, otherwise continue with step 3.
The marginal quality of an approximation constructed
by the above algorithm be the quantity q. The quality
q can range from zero to one. If the quality is equal
one then we have constructed a marginally consistent
conditional of Bel given X. If Bel is a probabilistic be-
lief function (with focal points being singleton sets),
then a marginally consistent Cano’s conditional of Bel
given X always exists. If Bel is a general belief function
possessing a marginally consistent Cano’s conditional
of Bel given X, then the construction by the above
algorithm of the conditional is characterized by the
fact that in step 4 we have ri(AX) =
⋃
ξX∈AX
ai(ξX).
However, the construction task as such is hard. In par-
ticular, we cannot assume that if there exists a Cano’s
conditional of Bel given X, and if and if for i=1,...,k we
managed to obtain ri(AX) =
⋃
ξX∈AX
ai(ξX), then we
will get a ri(AX) =
⋃
ξX∈AX
ai(ξX) for i=k+1. Con-
sider the following (counter)example: Let Bel be a be-
lief function separately measurable in X,Y, marginally
consistent with Bel1 ⊕Bel2 where Bel1 being a belief
function in X, Bel2 in X,Y with focal points:
AX m1(AX)
{x1} p1
{x2} p2
{x3} p2
{x1, x2} p12
{x1, x3} p13
{x2, x3} p23
AX,Y m2(AX,Y )
{(x1, y1), (x2, y1)(x3, y2)} 1/3
{(x1, y1), (x2, y2)(x3, y2)} 1/3
{(x1, y2), (x2, y1)(x3, y2)} 1/3
Obviously then Bel2 is the marginally consistent Cano
conditional of Bel. Let us select r1 as follows:
AX r1(AX)
{x1} {y1}
{x2} {y1}
{x3} {y1}
{x1, x2} {y1}
{x1, x3} {y1}
{x2, x3} {y1}
We can then easily construct function a1 as a1(x1) =
y1, a1(x2) = y1, a1(x3) = y1 so that obviously
r1(AX) =
⋃
ξX∈AX
a1(ξX). However, if we increase
in step 8 i to i=2 and reenter step 3, then it will
not be possible any more to construct such an a2 that
r2(AX) =
⋃
ξX∈AX
a2(ξX) because necessarily a frag-
ment of r2 will be:
AX r2(AX)
. . . . . .
{x1, x2} {y1, y2}
{x1, x3} {y1, y2}
{x2, x3} {y1, y2}
Hence in general finding a marginally consistent
Cano’s conditional, even if it exists, is hard and re-
quires backtracking. So probably one will be satisfied
already if one finds a high quality marginally correct
approximate conditional belief distribution (Applica-
tion of genetic algorithms is advised here.).
4 IMPACT ON REASONING
Let Bel be a belief function in X,Y and Bel|X its
marginally correct approximate conditional belief dis-
tribution. Then Bel↓X ⊕ Bel|X is a marginally cor-
rect approximation of Bel. Then Shafer’s condition-
ing Bel(||AX × ΞY ) with AX being any non-empty
subset of the domain ΞX of X is marginally correctly
approximated by (Bel↓X ⊕Bel|X)(||AX ×ΞY ), that is
given the ”decomposition” of Bel into its marginal on
X and the approximately correct conditional on X we
can reason approximately correctly about the a poste-
riori distribution of Y given any event of observation
of the intrinsic value of X. However, we cannot do it
in the reverse direction: we cannot derive the aposte-
rioric distribution of X by observation of Y because in
general Bel(||ΞX×AY ) with AY being any non-empty
subset of the domain ΞY of Y is NOT marginally cor-
rectly approximated by (Bel↓X ⊕Bel|X)(||ΞX ×AY ).
What is worse, even if the conditionals are marginally
consistent, we will not achieve marginal correctnesses,
not to say marginal consistency.
Thus, if we have a marginally consistent factorization
of a belief function then we can in general use nei-
ther Shafer & Shenoy nor Cano’s at al. framework
for propagation of uncertainty because the results will
be inconsistent with the data. A way out of this prob-
lem, for the framework of Cano, is to consider separate
marginally correct approximations in each direction of
reasoning. Given the polytree representing correctly
dependencies among variables, we need to transform
this polytree, for every variable the value of which we
want to infer, into a such a (belief) network graph that
every arrow points towards that variable. In case of
plain directed trees the result of this transformation
is a polytree (with undirected backbone identical with
that of the original tree) such that edges connecting
the target variable with its neighbous are reoriented
to point at the target variable and every other vari-
able is connected via a directed path with the tar-
get variable. In case of general polytree the result
of the transformation is a network with more edges
than the original polytree. Edges are added when an
edge is reversed which originally pointed at a node
with many ingoing edges. E.g. if we had the situation
that X− > Z < −Y and we want to invert the edge
Z < −Y , then we need to add the edge X− > Y . In
case of general polytree we obtain in this way networks
with considerably different undirected backbones3.
If we assume that we adopt a structure (factorization)
of Cano type, that is in form of a generalized polytree
(singly connected ”bayesian” network), then products
of above transformations are directly convertible into
a Shenoy’s and Shafer’s Markov tree. Let us now shift
to Shenoy’s and Shafer’s belief propagation in Markov
tree: The general principle there is ”message passing”
- if a node of Markov-tree gets information from its
all but one neighbors , then it sends, to the remain-
ing node, a ”message”, that is ⊕ combination of those
3In case of a general belief network transformations
aiming at creation of directed pathes from every node to-
wards the target variable would result in still more compli-
cated networks so that merits of reasoning in such networks
would be questionable
messages plus its own factor of the belief function fac-
torization. In the original Shenoy/Shafer algorithm,
this node’s own factor of the belief function factoriza-
tion is exactly the same independly to which neighbor
the message is sent. We propose to have separate hy-
pertrees for each target variable and to reason within
each of them in one direction only (resp. modifica-
tions of propagation algorithm are known). Then it is
guaranteed that the results of reasoning (a posteriori
marginal distributions) will be marginally correct ap-
proximations with respect to the intrinsic distribution.
Cano et al. conditionals are in fact sets of mappings
between sets of variables selected with some probabil-
ity. This gives a new meaning to the belief function.
Instead of thinking in the way probability functions
do that is that given some value of one variable, the
conditional probability distribution assigns a value to
another variable, we can think of objects that are as-
signed with some probability a belief.
5 DISCUSSION
Smets [27] stated that domains of MTE applications
are those where ”we are ignorant of the existence of
probabilities”, and warns that MTE is ”not a model
for poorly known probabilities” ([27], p.324). Smets
states further ”Far too often, authors concentrate on
the static component (how beliefs are allocated?) and
discover many relations between TBM (transferable
belief model of Smets) and ULP (upper lower proba-
bility) models, inner and outer measures (Fagin and
Halpern [6]), random sets (Nguyen [15]), probabilities
of provability (Pearl [16]), probabilities of necessity
(Ruspini [19]) etc. But these authors usually do not
explain or justify the dynamic component (how are
beliefs updated?), that is, how updating (condition-
ing) is to be handled (except in some cases by defining
conditioning as a special case of combination). So I
(that is Smets) feel that these partial comparisons are
incomplete, especially as all these interpretations lead
to different updating rules.” ([27], pp. 324-325). Iron-
ically, Smets gives later in the same paper an example
of belief function (”hostile-Mother-Nature-Example”)
which may be clearly considered as lower probability
interpretation of belief function, just, at further con-
sideration, leading to very same pitfalls as approaches
criticized himself.
In order to explicate the reasons of failures of vari-
ous attempts to establish a case-based interpretation of
MTE, in this paper we drew our attention to the ques-
tions related to updating (conditioning) in this the-
ory. We have investigated some fundamental problems
of case-based interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer
Mathematical Theory of Evidence.
• The problem of the meaning of a case for MTE. It
has been argued that if some observed attributes
are set-valued then the meaning of the case should
be the cross-product of all these sets (and not any
subset, e.g. a marginally consistent subset of this
cross product).
• The problem of meaning of aposteriori distribu-
tion given observation of some variables (Smets;
”updating” problem). It has been argued that, for
calculation of empirical (case-based) MTE apos-
teriori belief distributions, the interesting cases
need not only to be selected but also updated
• The problem of apriori-conditioning: it has been
argued that in general apriori conditionals of
(case-based) belief functions are not belief func-
tions, but rather pseudo-belief functions (with
negative basic ”probability” assigments), hence
lacking a case-baaed interpretation. What is
more, even every belief function marginally con-
sistent with a given case-based belief distribution
may lack apriori conditional belief function. In
the rare cases when a marginally consistent belief
function has an apriori conditional belief function,
there exits always Cano’s conditional belief func-
tion for that belief function.
• The problem of marginally correct approximation
of a belief function. It has been argued that even
if a marginally consistent Cano’s conditional be-
lief function for a belief function exists, it is hard
to find. Therefore one needs to look for algo-
rithms constructing marginally correct approxi-
mated apriori conditional belief functions. A gen-
eral frame algorithm has been given together with
a proposed function of quality evaluation of the
approximation.
• The problem of reasoning with marginally correct
approximations via conditional marginally correct
approximated apriori belief functions. It has been
argued that, if we want to achieve results corre-
sponding properly to empirical (case-based) belief
functions, it is necessary to abandon the tradi-
tional form of uncertainty propagation proposed
by Cano et al and by Shenoy and Shafer. Instead
of Markov fields, which are insensitive to the ori-
entation of reasoning, one shall use unidirectional
mode of reasoning.
6 CONCLUSION
1. The case-based derivation of aposteriori MTE be-
lief function requires combination of operations of
case selection with operation of case updating.
2. Therefore, marginally correct inference rules for
MTE derived from data can be applied only uni-
directionally - reversal of direction of reasoning
leads to contradictions with the data. For this
reason, original Cano et al. and Shenoy/Shafer
uncertainty propagation methods are not suitable
for case-based MTE belief functions.
3. Hence in case of direct dependence of a set of n
variables, n inferences networks - one for each
variable as dependent on the remaining ones -
have to be established and used depending on tar-
get variable.
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